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Abstract
We propose Picking a Needle in a Haystack (PiNcH ), a methodology
to detect the presence of a drone, its current status, and its movements by
leveraging just the communication traffic exchanged between the drone and
its Remote Controller (RC). PiNcH is built applying standard classification
algorithms to the eavesdropped traffic, analyzing features such as packets
inter-arrival time and size. PiNcH is fully passive and it requires just cheap
and general-purpose hardware. To evaluate the effectiveness of our solution,
we collected real communication traces originated by a drone running the
widespread ArduCopter open-source firmware, currently mounted on-board
of a wide range (30+) of commercial amateur drones. Then, we tested our
solution against different publicly available wireless traces. The results prove
that PiNcH can efficiently and effectively: (i) identify the presence of the
drone in several heterogeneous scenarios; (ii) identify the current state of a
powered-on drone, i.e., flying or lying on the ground; (iii) discriminate the
movements of the drone; and, finally, (iv) enjoy a reduced upper bound on the
time required to identify a drone with the requested level of assurance. The
effectiveness of PiNcH has been also evaluated in the presence of both heavy
packet loss and evasion attacks. In this latter case, the adversary modifies on
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purpose the profile of the traffic of the drone-RC link to avoid the detection.
In both the cited cases, PiNcH continues enjoying a remarkable performance.
Further, the comparison against state of the art solution confirms the superior
performance of PiNcH in several scenarios. Note that all the drone-controller
generated data traces have been released as open-source, to allow replicability
and foster follow-up. Finally, the quality and viability of our solution, do
prove that network traffic analysis can be successfully adopted for drone
identification and status discrimination, and pave the way for future research
in the area.
Keywords: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Drones Detection, RF Passive
Detection, Intrusion Detection.
1. Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, are becom-
ing extremely popular due to their increasingly low prices and appealing
functionalities. Indeed, drones are already adopted for several tasks such as
inspections, perimeter control, remote surveillance, and emergencies [1].
Unfortunately, drones represent the classical dual-use technology that,
while providing great benefits, could also be adopted for malicious intents,
such as taking video/image pictures of—or violating [2]—restricted-access
areas [3], or even being used-as/carrying weapons against selected targets.
The latter one is one of the major threats, not only for people [4] but also
for critical infrastructures such as airports and industrial sites, to name a
few. The International Air Transportation Association (IATA) warned of
“an exponential increase in reports of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPA) operating dangerously close to manned aircraft and airports” [5].
While self-operated drones represent an expensive attack vector, also sub-
ject to GPS spoofing/jamming countermeasures, Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS) drones are cheap and can be piloted for kilometers away
from the operator due to the presence of a First Person View (FPV) chan-
nel. Furthermore, several unintentional near-hit and collisions have been
reported between aircraft and drones [6], due to the lack of understanding on
the drones operators’ side. Indeed, the frequency of these accidental events
can only increase, due to the widespread use of drones for both recreational
and commercial purposes [7].
Moreover, drones can also be used to intentionally launch attacks against
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targets. For instance, an attack was launched in Syria on Russian military
bases via a fleet of crudely made drones, each one equipped with GPS and
powered by what appeared to be lawn mower engines, with each drone car-
rying nearly half a kilogram of high potential explosives [6].
Several drone countermeasures have been developed and already deployed.
Some of them involve the use of jammers to disable the remote controller of
the drone, hence forcing it to land, the use of other drones to chase the
not-authorized one and, finally, weapons to shoot the drone down [8]. While
several start-ups have already developed different anti-drone solutions mainly
based on radar detection and jamming, an interesting academic solution is
represented by ADS-ZJU [9], where the authors propose an integrated ap-
proach combining multiple passive surveillance technologies to realize drone
detection, localization, and radiofrequency jamming. At the same time, sev-
eral projects on drone detection have been funded by the European Union
within the H2020 program, including SafeShore1 and Aladdin2, to name a
few (see Sec. 2) for more details.
While drone counter-measures have already reached a significant level of
reliability, drone detection can only rely on a few effective techniques [10].
Among the various techniques, four major strategies are emerging: (i) visual
detection; (ii) audio detection; (iii) radar; and, (iv) RF detection. Visual
detection mainly relies on the distribution of camera equipment in the area
to be protected and the implementation of video processing techniques to
identify anomalies in the video stream [11]. Audio detection resorts to the
generation of an audio signature of the drone propellers to be used to train
a classifier [12]; such a technique further requires arrays of microphones to
be deployed in the area to be monitored [13]. Conversely, radar detection
involves the transmission of RF signals to receive an RF echo that can be
identified and tracked [14]. Radars, while being the most powerful among
the detection strategies, are expensive equipment that eventually might not
be effective to detect small devices such as drones—since the radar signature
is quite blurred. Finally, RF-based techniques resort to the generation of RF
fingerprints by looking at the communication channel between the drone and
its remote controller [15]. RF fingerprinting is a promising technique that
has been used for several purposes, but it requires specific equipment such
1http://safeshore.eu
2https://aladdin2020.eu
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as Software Defined Radios (SDRs). However, cheap SDRs available on the
market, such as the RTL-SDR, cannot be considered fully reliable, especially
when operating at high frequencies.
Thus, we observe that the current literature still misses a viable and
cheap solution, not requiring any dedicated hardware, while enabling the
recognition not only of the presence of an RPAS drone, but also its current
state in a real-time perspective. What is more, such a solution should be
robust to packet loss, as well as evasion attacks.
Our contribution. In this manuscript, we present Picking a Needle
in a Haystack (PiNcH ), a solution to detect an RPAS drone based on en-
crypted network traffic analysis. Compared to our initial contribution in
[16], PiNcH significantly improves the current state of the art in remotely-
controlled drones detection with several contributions:
• Drone detection. PiNcH can detect the presence of a drone in different
heterogeneous scenarios such as a library, a cafeteria, a conference, and
outdoor areas.
• Drone state identification. PiNcH can discriminate the current state
of a powered-on drone, i.e., if the drone is either flying or lying on the
ground.
• Detection delay. We provide a statistical analysis of the detection delay
for each of the aforementioned classification scenarios as a function of
the requested level of assurance.
• Packet Loss. We study the effect of packet loss on the performance
of PiNcH, by testing the detection accuracy when the eavesdropping
equipment is located at increasing distances from the drone. We demon-
strate PiNcH to be able to overcome packet loss issues and to guarantee
very high detection accuracy even at 200 meters from the position of
the drone.
• Evasion strategy. We test the effectiveness of PiNcH in the presence
of evasion strategies, where the adversary reshapes the traffic profile
of the controller-drone communication channel by introducing random
delays between the message packets. We show that the effectiveness of
such a strategy strongly depends on the specific deployment scenario,
though, in general, it should be noted that it significantly reduces the
maneuverability of the drone.
4
• Movement identification. PiNcH can infer on the current movement of
the drone, discriminating if the drone is increasing its altitude, moving
forward, backward, left or right.
To the best of our knowledge, PiNcH represents the first comprehensive
solution able to detect an RPAS drone and, at the same time, its current
state in real-time, looking only at the wireless traffic. Other unique features
enjoyed by PiNcH are its robustness to packet loss and the possibility to
reject evasion attacks, based on the specific deployment scenario.
At the same time, we stress that PiNcH aims to detect an RPAS drone,
where a remote controller is communicating with the drone. Indeed, PiNcH
cannot detect an autonomous drone, given that no communication between
the controller and the drone is involved. However, for these scenarios, other
solutions based on acoustic, visual, or radar techniques are applicable. In
addition, due to its lightweight and non-invasive features, PiNcH can be
integrated with other drone detection techniques, to build a multi-method
framework leveraging multiple means to detect an approaching drone.
The results included in this paper have been obtained by using the popular
drones’ firmware ArduCopter, within the Ardupilot operating system. Thus,
consistently with other recent work in the literature such as [17], beyond the
3DR SOLO drone used in this paper, our results are fully applicable also to
over 30 products, including DJI and HobbyKing vehicles, to name a few34.
The drone-controller data traces we have generated in this work have been
released as open-source (available at [18]), to allow practitioners, industries,
and academia to verify our claims and to use them as a basis for further
development.
Finally, we remark that the aim of this paper is neither to propose a
new intrusion detection algorithm nor to discuss new machine learning tech-
niques. Indeed, we discuss and demonstrate, through an extensive measure-
ment campaign run over an open-source operating system, that the pres-
ence, the status, and the specific operational mode of commercial remotely-
operated drones can be identified using already available classification tools,
paving the way to further research efforts by both critical infrastructure de-
fense teams and drone operators.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 re-
3http://ardupilot.org/copter/docs/common-rtf.html#common-rtf
4http://ardupilot.org/copter/docs/common-autopilots.html
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views related work, Section 3 introduces the system and the adversary models
assumed in this work, while Section 4 details the measurement scenario and
provides some details about the measurements and the characterization of
the network traffic generated by the drone. Section 5 introduces the method-
ology we used for the acquisition, processing, and classification of the network
traffic generated by the drone and the remote controller, while Sections 6 and
7 show the performance of our proposal for detecting the state of the drone
and the presence of the drone in different heterogeneous scenarios, with a
look also on the detection delay. Section 8 introduces the results related
to the identification of each movement the drone can take, while Section 9
reports the performance of PiNcH at increasing distances from the drone
and when evasion strategies are applied by the adversary. Finally, Section
11 reports some concluding remarks.
2. Related work
In the last years, the widespread diffusion of commercial drones has paved
the way for several research contributions discussing the potential identifica-
tion of UAVs in a certain area of interest.
The authors in [3] built a proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance
against spy drones by determining whether a certain person or object is un-
der aerial surveillance. They show methods that leverage physical stimuli
to detect whether the drones camera is directed towards a target in real-
time. They demonstrate how an interceptor can perform a side-channel at-
tack to detect whether a target is being streamed by analyzing the encrypted
First-Person View (FPV) channel that is transmitted from a real drone (DJI
Mavic) in two use cases: when the target is a private house and when the
target is a subject. A similar target, i.e. video streaming detection, has
been investigated in the recent work by the authors in [19], focusing on the
signal strength in the communication between the drone and its controller.
Although being a significant step towards drone identification, these solu-
tions are specifically designed to identify drones that are employed to target
a specific target, while not being suitable for drone’s detection at large or for
drones that do not necessarily feature FPV.
The authors in [20] showed that the radio control signal sent to a UAV
using a typical transmitter can be captured and analyzed to identify the con-
trolling pilot using machine learning techniques. The authors collected the
messages exchanged between the drone and the remote controller, and used
6
them to train multiple classifiers. They observed that the best performance
is reached by a random forest classifier achieving an accuracy of around 90%
using simple time-domain features. The authors also provided extensive tests
showing that the classification accuracy depends on the flight trajectory. In
addition, they proved that the control signals, i.e., pitch, roll, yaw, and throt-
tle, have specific importance for pilot identification. The work focused on a
scenario where civil UAVs are remotely controlled by different pilots, there
is no (or weak) authentication on the ground-to-aircraft command channel,
and also there is little to null difference in the low-level timing or power of
the control signals. In addition, they assumed that the pilots could carry out
identical maneuvers, as well as the existence and availability of trustworthy
recordings of each pilots behavior. While exploiting the same principle, i.e.,
classification of the traffic, the related work focuses on the pilot and not on
drone identification.
The authors in [21] explored the feasibility of RF-based detection of
drones by looking at radio physical characteristics of the communication
channel when the drones’ body is affected by vibration and body shifting.
The analysis considered whether the received drone signals are uniquely dif-
ferentiated from other mobile wireless phenomena such as cars equipped with
Wi-Fi or humans carrying a mobile phone. The sensitivity of detection at
distances of hundreds of meters as well as the accuracy of the overall de-
tection system are evaluated using a SDR implementation. Being based on
both Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and phase of the signals, the
precision of the approach varies with the distance of the receiver from the
transmitter. In addition, the solution resorts to physical layer information
and special hardware (SDR), while our current contribution only exploits
network layer information that can be collected by any WiFi device.
An identification mechanism based on the correlation between motion
observed from an external camera and acceleration measured on each UAV’s
accelerometer is proposed by the authors in [22]. This solution combines
FPV information with accelerometer information to remotely control a sub-
set of swarm drones that are not provided with a camera, and therefore it
requires the collaboration of one or more drones in the swarm to perform the
identification.
Fingerprinting of wireless radio traffic at the network layer is emerging as
a promising technique to uniquely identify devices in the wild. The authors
in [23] proved that the extraction of unique fingerprints provides a reliable
and robust means for device identification.
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A fingerprinting approach for drone identification is proposed in [24].
The authors analyzed the WiFi communication protocol used by drones and
developed three unique methods to identify a specific drone model: (i) exam-
ining the time intervals between probe request frames; (ii) utilizing the signal
strength carried in the frame header; and, finally (iii) exploiting some frame
header fields with specific values. However, fingerprint approaches require
specific equipment to be used, such as the Software Defined Radios (SDRs).
Network-Based traffic classification is proposed in [25]. The authors de-
scribe a WiFi-based approach aimed at detecting nearby aerial or terrestrial
devices by performing statistical fingerprint analysis on wireless traffic. They
proved network-layer classification to be a viable means to classify classes of
drones, i.e., aerial, terrestrial, and hybrid scenarios. However, their approach
does not take into account the identification of drone traffic compared to stan-
dard WiFi traffic. The same authors extend the aforementioned contribution
in [26], by proposing a WiFi statistical fingerprint method to drone detection.
Their solution can identify the presence of a drone and the associated video
streaming. Similarly, the authors in [27] adopted encrypted traffic analysis
techniques to identify the presence of a drone, considering Parrot, DJI, and
DBPower drones. However, these solutions (available on the arXiv portal
later than the present contribution) take into account very specific drones
based on a proprietary architecture (DJI, Parrot), and they can detect only
the presence of the drone without inferring its current status. Finally, the
authors prove the feasibility of their solution considering self-generated traces
as network noise, while in this work, we consider 5 publicly available data-sets
and one (generated by us) from an outdoor area.
Another passive detection technique is proposed in [28]. The authors
presented a technique specifically designed for two reference scenarios: (i) a
drone communicating with the ground controller, where the cyclo-stationarity
signature of the drone signal and pseudo Doppler principle are employed; and,
(ii) a drone that is not sending any signal, where a micro-Doppler signature
generated by the RF signal is exploited for detection and identification. Also
in this case, the authors resort to both SDRs and physical layer fingerprint-
ing, thus making their solution very hardware-invasive.
Machine learning techniques have been successfully used for other pur-
poses in this research field. In [29], the authors proposed a wireless power
transfer system that predicts the drone’s behavior based on the flight data,
utilizing machine learning techniques and Naive Bayes algorithms.
In [30], the authors demonstrated that machine learning can successfully
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predict the transmission patterns in a drone network. The packet transmis-
sion rates of a communication network with twenty drones were simulated,
and results were used to train the linear regression and Support Vector Ma-
chine with Quadratic Kernel (SVM-QK).
Standard anti-drone active detection techniques resort to radar [31, 32,
33]. Nevertheless, those techniques involve the transmission of signals and
specific devices for the detection of the echo fingerprint.
The authors in [34] analyze the basic architecture of a drone and propose
a generic drone forensic model that would improve the digital investigation
process. They also provide recommendations on how one should perform
forensics on the various components of a drone such as a camera and Wi-Fi.
Finally, we highlight that several projects tackling the detection of am-
ateur or remotely-piloted drones have been funded by the European Union
within the H2020 program, including SafeShore5 and Aladdin6, to name a
few (see Sec. 2) for more details. With specific reference to coastal border-
surveillance, the SafeShore project aims at detecting Remotely Piloted Air-
craft Systems (RPAS) carrying out illegal activities via passive and low-cost
technologies, being very close to the aim of this project. The threats and
the system requirements considered in this project has been discussed by the
authors in [35]. The project SafeShore has also launched a specific challenge,
namely the drone-vs-bird detection challenge, dedicated to addressing one of
the many technical issues arising in this context [36], [37]. Another solu-
tion is the one that is being developed within another EU project, namely
Advanced hoListic Adverse Drone Detection, Identification & Neutralization
(ALADDIN). The ALADDIN project aims to develop a complete product
for the drone detection problem, leveraging a combination of the systems de-
scribed above, including radar, video, sound, and further detection methods
(for more details and publication overview, see the website7 of the project).
To sum up, none of the previous contributions can detect a drone and its
current status by only exploiting the wireless traffic. Moreover, differently
from the current literature, our contribution provides a thorough measure-
ment campaign adopting a widely accepted open-source operating system
and firmware for drones, included in over 30 products, as well as a detailed
5http://safeshore.eu
6https://aladdin2020.eu
7https://aladdin2020.eu/reports-publications/
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analysis adopting a different type of wireless network traffic to prove its ro-
bustness. Finally, a study of the effectiveness of evasion attacks against drone
detection strategies based on traffic analysis is provided in our contribution,
as well as how packet loss phenomena can affect our strategy, differently from
the previous work.
We will provide a qualitative and experimental comparison between PiNcH
and related approaches in Section 10.
3. System and Adversary Model
Adversarial model. In this paper, we assume a scenario characterized
by an RPAS drone flying over a no-fly-zone, where the GPS is not avail-
able. Indeed, we recall that drones leveraging GPS navigation can be easily
defeated by adopting GPS-spoofing and jamming techniques. We assume
the drone is remotely controlled by a malicious operator that intentionally
wants to fly the drone across the border of a restricted-access area such as an
airport, industrial plant, or critical infrastructure. We also assume that the
adversary is deploying additional countermeasures preventing drone identi-
fication, such as dynamically changing the MAC addresses of the network
interfaces of both the drone and the remote controller. In addition, we as-
sume the link between the RC and the drone is encrypted at the layer-2 of
the communication link, and therefore packet content cannot be inspected.
We assume also that the link between the controller and the drone cannot
be jammed, as the same frequencies are used for legitimate communications
by other devices.
Finally, we initially assume that the adversary does not apply any eva-
sion techniques, e.g., it does not modify the transmission rate and the length
of the packets to mitigate the detection. However, in Section 9 we discuss
the effectiveness of PiNcH in presence of a particular type of evasion attack,
where the adversary delays on purpose the packets to be transmitted by the
RC and the drone, to avoid the detection. Overall, while implementing such
countermeasures might improve the probability of escaping detection, their
overall efficacy is not guaranteed, as a new training of our model would suf-
fice to identify again the status of the drone. Further, the application of
evasion strategies requires further feasibility studies based on the specific re-
quirements of the application [38]. Indeed, introducing an artificial delay in
the communication between the RC and the drone could affect user experi-
ence, to the point that the planned mission could be aborted. In addition,
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none of the actual commercial products implement such features, making our
proposed solution effective.
System model. Our main goal is the passive detection of the remotely-
controlled drone without resorting to: (i) active radar technology [32]; (ii)
audio/visual detection [39]; or, (iii) physical stimuli to FPV [3]. Our solution
does not require any intervention in the already existing ICT infrastructure
and it does not conflict with any already deployed RF system. Indeed, PiNcH
exploits only the messages transmitted between the remote controller and
the drone, and therefore it only requires a fully passive eavesdropper to be
deployed in the region to be controlled.
Figure 1 wraps up on the system and adversarial models: the adversary
(A) is determined to remotely fly a drone (D) into a no-fly zone (CI). Our
solution can detect the drone’s presence by simply deploying a WiFi probe
(P). We observe that the WiFi probe can eavesdrop both the traffic from the
controller to the drone (A-D) and the one from the drone to the controller
(D-A).
Figure 1: System model: a no-fly zone (e.g. critical infrastructure — CI) featuring a WiFi
probe (P) to detect an approaching drone (D) remotely controlled by an adversary (A).
.
Despite our measurement campaign was performed using the 2.4 GHz
frequency band and the WiFi communication technology, the methodology
proposed in this paper can be easily extended to work on any operating fre-
quency, provided that one (or more) receivers are available on that particular
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frequency, independently on the usage of any encryption technique. Indeed,
we remark that most of the commercial drones, including the ones running
the ArduCopter Operating System, use either the 2.4 GHz frequency band
or the 900 MHz ISM band.
4. Measurement scenario and Preliminary considerations
Our measurement scenario is constituted by a 3DR SOLO drone[40] and a
wireless probe capable of eavesdropping the radio traffic. The 3DR Solo drone
is an open-source architecture featuring the Pixhawk 2.0 flight controller and
the ArduCopter 3.3 firmware. The drone has been configured for the manual
mode, i.e., GPS switched off, and therefore, being able to fly both in indoor
and outdoor environments. As a wireless probe, we adopted Wireshark 2.4.5,
running in a Lenovo Ideapad 320 featuring Linux Kali 4.15.0. We configured
the WiFi card of our laptop to work in monitor mode, eavesdropping and
logging all the transmitted packets by either the remote controller or the
drone. Figure 2 shows our measurement set-up.
Figure 2: Our measurement set-up: the drone, the remote controller, and the laptop we
used to eavesdrop the radio spectrum.
.
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Subsequently, we collected several packets from the controller-drone link,
while the drone was performing two different types of actions, as depicted
below:
• Steady (S). The drone is associated with the remote controller but it
lays on the ground.
• Movement (M). The drone is flying around, performing several move-
ments in all directions.
Table 1 wraps up on the two states of the drone and provides ground for some
preliminary considerations on the collected measurements. Firstly, we break
down the communication link into 4 different flows: (i) the packets sent by
the RC to the Drone; (ii) the packets sent by the Drone to the RC; (iii) the
packets broadcast by the RC; and, finally (iv) the packets broadcast by the
drone. Secondly, we considered a measurement lasting for about 10 minutes
for the Steady-state, where the drone is associated to the remote controller
but it is lying on the ground; then, we unscrewed the propellers from the
drone and we “flew” the drone for about 10 minutes for the Movement state.
During the flight, we performed different maneuvers by continuously moving
the control sticks. The percentage of exchanged packets is similar in both
the drone’s states, i.e., about 36% of the traffic is transmitted by the RC,
while about 58% of the traffic is received by the RC. This is consistent, as
the drone is required to transmit more traffic to the RC, for the RC to be
always able to know precisely the full status of the drone. Finally, we observe
the presence of broadcast traffic transmitted by the RC (about 6%), while
we did not detect any broadcast communication transmitted by the drone
after the pairing process.
In the following analysis, we focus on two packet attributes: packet size
and packet inter-arrival time. For both the attributes, we took the previously
identified flows from Section 4, and we analyzed the size of the packets for
the 4 different flows combining the two states, i.e., Steady and Movement,
and the packets traveling from the RC to the drone, and from the drone back
to the RC.
Packet size analysis. Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution function
associated with each packet size belonging to the four different flows. Firstly,
the vast majority of packets transmitted in the configuration S, RC to drone
(red circles) have the size equal to 156 Bytes. A similar phenomenon can be
observed for M, RC to drone (black crosses). Conversely, the flows coming
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Table 1: Drone’s states and flows: We considered 2 different states, i.e., Steady and
Movement, and 4 different unidirectional communication flows, i.e., RC to Drone, Drone
to RC, RC to broadcast and, finally, Drone to Broadcast.
State Source Destination N. of Pkts Flow/Link (%)
Steady
(S)
RC Drone 32706 35.8
Drone RC 52856 57.8
RC Broadcast 5789 6.4
Drone Broadcast 0 0
Movement
(M)
RC Drone 32868 34.6
Drone RC 56248 59.2
RC Broadcast 5837 6.2
Drone Broadcast 0 0
from the drone are characterized by very different packet sizes spanning from
130 to 1144 Bytes, while more packets are transmitted by the drone when it
is in the Steady-state, i.e., blue crosses have on average higher values than
the green stars. These considerations motivated us to consider as “discrimi-
nating features” also the mean and the standard deviation of the packet size,
computed over time windows of a different duration.
Inter-arrival time analysis. We extracted the time associated with all
the events belonging to the same flow and we differentiated them obtaining
the inter-arrival times. Figure 4 shows the number of packets as a func-
tion of their inter-arrival time. Firstly, we observe periodic packets at 20ms
and 40ms transmitted by the RC to the drone in both the drone’s states.
Then, we observe how the two drone’s states, i.e., Steady and Movement, are
characterized by almost the same profile: there are only minor differences
at about 31µs and between 50µs and 90µs. Indeed, the correlation coeffi-
cients computed over the frequency distribution functions are 0.71 and 0.75,
for the flows transmitted and received by the remote controller, respectively.
Finally, for both the considered drone’s state, we observe that the drone is
transmitting more data then the RC, i.e., blue and green curves are higher
than the black and red ones.
Broadcast traffic. Packets transmitted to the broadcast address by the re-
mote controller have the same size (289 bytes) and an interarrival time equal
to 100ms in both the drone’s state. Given their strictly periodic nature, we
do not consider them further in our analysis.
14
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Packet size [Bytes]
101
102
103
104
105
N
um
be
r o
f e
ve
nt
s
S, RC to Drone
S, Drone to RC
M, RC to Drone
M, Drone to RC
Figure 3: Packet size analysis: Number of packets as a function of their size considering
the four communication flows. The total number of collected packets (events) is 174677.
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Figure 4: Packet size analysis: Number of packets as a function of their size considering
the four communication flows. The total number of collected packets (events) is 174677.
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5. Methodology
We now introduce PiNcH, our solution to drone’s detection, and we test it
against the previously introduced drone’s states, i.e., Steady and Movement.
As our classification tools, we adopted a series of scripts developed using
Matlab R2019a and the Machine Learning toolbox. For our analysis, we
consider the following configuration:
• Classifiers. We considered the Random Forest algorithm, being the
best among those we tried (see [16] for more details).
• Flows. We consider 3 different flows, i.e., RC to drone, drone to RC,
and the overall link.
• Features. We look at 6 different features, i.e., interarrival time, packet
size, mean and standard deviation computed over a certain number of
samples of interarrival time and packet size.
Figure 5 introduces the details of PiNcH, i.e., our proposed solution.
The notation used throughout the rest of this work is summarized in Tab. 2.
Figure 5: PiNcH classification methodology: (i) WiFi radio eavesdropping, (ii) attribute
extraction, (iii) feature generation, and (iv) classification.
Lower case letters refer to a scalar value, while a boldface lowercase letter,
e.g., l, is used to represent a vector. The vector elements are listed within
brackets. We assume a communication link between the drone (D) and the
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Table 2: Notation used throughout the paper.
Notation Description
N Number of Packets of dataset A.
an Arrival Time of the generic n-th packet.
pn Size of the generic n-th packet.
sn Source MAC address of the generic n-th packet.
dn Destination MAC address of the generic n-th packet.
J Number of Packets of dataset B.
tn Interarrival Time between the n-th packet and (n+ 1)-th packet.
F Number of Features extracted from each trace.
xn,f Generic f-th feature of the n-th packet.
L Number of labels.
yn Label associated to the n-th packet, being yn = [0, 1].
W Window size used for features computation.
D Overall matrix used for classification.
M Overall number of packets used for classification.
x Feature set in the matrix D.
y Label set in the matrix D.
hk(x) Generic k-th decision tree classifier working on the features set x.
at Threshold value on the node t of the decision tree classifier.
Θk Parameters set of the k-th decision tree classifier.
H(T ) Entropy of the data-set T .
Pl Probability that the generic label l is present in a dataset.
IG(T, a) Information Gain derived from the split of dataset T with the
threshold a.
vals(xk) Set of possible values for the feature xk.
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adversary (A) constituted by two flows: remote controller to drone and back-
ward. In summary, PiNcH requires that both the flows are eavesdropped by
a WiFi probe, collecting two attributes: the interarrival time between subse-
quent packets and the packet size. Subsequently, a set of features is generated
from the attributes. Indeed, for each instance of the attributes, i.e., each pair
of [interarrival time - packet size], we compute the mean and standard devia-
tion on a predetermined sequence of lines, for both the interarrival time and
the packet size. The new data set of features is then provided to the classifier.
Overall, PiNcH consists of four (4) phases, that are: (i) WiFi Radio Eaves-
dropping ; (ii) Attributes Extraction; (iii) Feature Generation; and (iv) Clas-
sification. The operations executed in each of them are described below.
In the WiFi Radio Eavesdropping Phase, we collect a large number of mea-
surements, using standard WiFi eavesdropping equipment. Specifically, we
first collected a dataset constituted by samples from a specific traffic profile
that we want to detect. We denote with N the number of packets included
in such a dataset
Attribute Extraction. During the Attribute Extraction Phase, for each
n-th packet, we denote with an the arrival time of the packet, i.e., the time
when the packet was received, and with pn the corresponding packet size.
Also, we denote the source MAC address of the packet as sn and the desti-
nation MAC address as dn. Thus, each received packet is represented by a
vector in the form [sn, dn, an, pn]. We denote this data-set as A, being char-
acterized by a label value yn = 0.
For training purposes, we also collect an additional trace, containing wire-
less traffic related to another profile, different from the one considered in
the data-set A. Each packet in this trace is represented by the attributes
described before, and thus it is a vector in the form [sj, dj, aj, pj]. We as-
sume a total number of J packets, and we denote this data-set as B, being
characterized by a label value yj = 1.
Note that this methodology can be extended to include further profiles of
traffic of interest, for a total number of labels equal to L, where each profile
can be distinguished from the others for the specific value of the associated
label. For ease of discussion and without loss of generality, in the following
we assume two classes, and thus a binary problem (L = 2), with y = [0, 1].
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Feature Generation. In the Feature Generation phase, for all the data-sets,
we extracted the interarrival times of the packets. Considering the generic
n-th packet of the data-set A, we compute the interarrival time between the
n-th packet and the (n+ 1)-th packet, as tn = an+1− an, and we replace the
arrival time an with the interarrival time tn. As a result, the trace A contains
N − 1 vectors in the form [sn, dn, tn, pn], while the trace B contains J − 1
vectors in the form [sj, dj, tj, pj].
Starting from these traces, we create new data-sets, by extracting a number
of features F = 6 for each packet, where each f-th feature (f = 1, . . . , 6) is
computed as described below. With reference to the trace A, the following
steps are executed:
• The first feature (x1) is the packet size, namely xn,1 = pn;
• the second feature (x2) is the interarrival time between the n-th packet
and the (n+ 1)-th packet, namely xn,2 = tn+1 − tn;
• the third feature (x3) is the mean packet size, computed over a vector
having size W , namely xn,3 =
1
W
·∑Wn=1 pn;
• the fourth feature (x4) is the mean interarrival time, computed over a
vector having size W , namely xn,4 =
1
W
·∑Wn=1 tn;
• the fifth feature (x5) is the standard deviation of the packet size, com-
puted over a vector having size W , namely xn,5 =
√∑W
n=1(pn−xn,3)
W
;
• the sixth feature (x6) is the standard deviation of the interarrival time,
computed over a vector having size W , namely xn,6 =
√∑W
n=1(tn−xn,4)
W
;
• finally, for each n-th packet, we insert a label (yn), where yn = [0, 1],
indicating the specific data-set the packet is related to.
Note that the above process is repeated also for the trace B. The result of
the Feature Generation phase is the creation of two matrices, namely DA
and DB, containing the features and the labels of all the packets in both
the data-sets. We mix the matrices DA and DB, creating a single matrix D,
having a total number of M = N + J packets, in the form depicted in the
following Eq. 1.
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D =

x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,6 y1
x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,6 y2
...
...
. . .
...
xm,1 xm,2 . . . xm,6 ym
...
...
. . .
...
xM,1 xM,2 . . . xM,6 yM

= {x,y} (1)
This matrix is given in input to the Classification Phase, and it is used to
classify and predict the class of the packets.
Classification. The goal of the Classification Phase is to build a classi-
fier, which predicts the label yn from the features xn, based on the data-set
D, given an ensemble of classifiers h = {h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hK(x)}, where the
classifiers h are decision trees, and therefore, the ensemble is a Random For-
est.
Specifically, a decision tree is a classification tool leveraging a tree-like graph
or decision model, including event probability, resource costs, and utility. It
is a useful tool to represent an algorithm containing only conditional control
statements. Formally, a classification tree is a decision tree where each node
has a binary possible decision, depending on whether the input feature xf is
subject or not to the condition xf < a, being a a threshold parameter of the
decision tree. The top node of the decision tree is defined as the root node,
and it contains the whole data-sample. Then, the data-sample is binarily
sub-divided into smaller parts, namely sub-samples, where each sub-sample
satisfies (or not) the condition defined by the threshold. The criterion is that
the subdivision continues until each sub-group has only a single label, thus
being related to a single class, or there is not any further sub-division that
improves the actual situation.
There are several algorithms for constructing decision trees, i.e., to decide
the value of the threshold a on each node of the tree. These techniques
work top-down, by choosing a threshold at each step that best splits the set
of items. Some examples include Gain Impurity Maximization, Information
Gain Maximization, and Variance Reduction. In our approach, we selected
the Information Gain Maximization approach, whose main logic is described
in the following.
• We first compute the entropy of the data-set, namely H(T ), as in the
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following Eq. 2.
H(T ) = −
L−1∑
l=0
Pl · log2 Pl, (2)
where Pl is the probability of each class present in the child node that
results from a split in the tree, with
∑L−1
l=0 Pl = 1 [41].
• Then, given a threshold value a, the Information Gain IG(T, a) derived
from the split of trees with the threshold a is defined as in the following
Eq. 3.
IG(T, a) = H(T )−H(T |a) =
= −
L−1∑
l=0
Pl · log2 Pl − P (a) ·
L−1∑
l=0
P (l|a) · log2 P (l|a). (3)
• The specific threshold value at, selected at the node t of the tree, is the
one that maximizes the information gain in the dataset T , as in Eq. 4.
at = max
a∈vals(xk)
IG(T, a), (4)
where the notation vals(xk) refers to the set of possible values for the
feature xk.
The above strategies are used to obtain the set of decision trees that best
fit the data, i.e., by maximizing the information gain. Note that the specific
parameters of the best decision trees are not fixed, but they can vary due
to the randomness in the usage order of the features and according to the
specific strategy used to obtain the threshold at each node of the tree. More
details on further techniques and optimizations used in the implementation
of decision trees can be found in [41] and [42].
Now, considering a large number of decision trees, a Random Forest is a
generalized classifier that considers many decision trees together. Formally,
a Random Forest is a classifier based on a family of classification trees h =
{h(x|Θ1), . . . , h(x|ΘK)}, where Θk are the parameters of the classification
trees, that are randomly chosen from a model random vector Θ. Note that
these parameters refer to the variables of the decision tree, including the
structure of the tree, the number of layers, and the configuration of the
threshold values.
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Assuming the final classification of x is denoted by f(x) = y, and each
decision tree hk(x) casts a vote for the most popular class that is yk(x), we
have that f(x) = y is the most popular classification of x in the ensemble of
decision trees, i.e., formally:
f(x) = y = max
l0,l1
{[
K∑
k=1
(hk(x) == 0) ,
K∑
k=1
(hk(x) == 1)
]}
. (5)
We refer the interested readers to the technical works on Decision Trees and
Random Forest classification by the authors in [43] and [44] for details about
the classification accuracy and further improvements on specific estimation
techniques.
Finally, we highlight that, for the Random Forest classification algorithm,
we used the 10-folds cross-validation method, i.e., a technique to evaluate
the classifier performance by partitioning the original sample into a training
set (9 randomly chosen folds) to train the model, and a test set to evaluate
it (the remaining fold from excluding the 9 previously chosen). This is a
standard technique used in data mining processes, and further details can be
found in [45].
6. Drone scenario identification: Is it flying?
In this section, we introduce the methodology used by PiNcH to identify
the current state of the drone, i.e., Steady or Movement. To this end, we
structured the detection system over the following steps: eavesdropping the
WiFi spectrum, collecting packets, generating the associated features, and
classifying the incoming traffic, as discussed in Section 5. For each instance in
the features set, we challenge the classifier to identify the state of the drone.
In particular, we consider 5 different metrics: True Positive (TP), False Posi-
tive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Negative (TN), and the overall Success
Rate (SR) as the number of correct classifications (TP+TN) divided by the
total number of classifications (TP+TN+FP+FN). Table 3 depicts the re-
sults of the 10-fold cross-validation, assuming the three aforementioned clas-
sifiers and metrics with the features computed over a reference time window
of 200 consecutive samples. Link fingerprinting achieves the worst perfor-
mance, while the unique flows, i.e., RC to Drone and Drone to RC, behave
almost in the same way. Considering the one-way links, we observe that
both FP and FN are less than 9%. Finally, for each configuration, we report
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(in percentage) the overall SR being equal to the total number of correctly
classified instances.
Table 3: Detection of drone’s state considering different flows. All the values are in
percentages [%], while the Random Forest (RF) classifier is used as the classification tool.
Classifier Flow TP FP FN TN SR
RF
RC to Drone 92.37 7.63 8.65 91.35 91.86
Drone to RC 92.98 7.02 6.89 93.11 93.05
Link 88.15 11.85 8.57 91.43 89.69
Detection delay. We now consider the time to detect the state of the
drone. Given the results of the previous section, we assume the Random
Forest classifier using the 10-folds cross-validation method and the unicast
traffic collected from the two links, i.e., RC to Drone and Drone to RC. Fig-
ure 6 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve associated
with the aforementioned configuration while varying the number of samples
used for the generation of the features. Indeed, as in the previous case, we
considered the inter-arrival time, the packet size, and their mean and stan-
dard deviation computed over partially overlapping sliding windows of size
spanning between 50 and 500 samples.
Increasing the number of samples used to compute the mean and the
standard deviation significantly improves the performance of the detection
process. To provide few reference performance indicators, considering 200
samples, we can achieve 0.91 of True Positive Rate and 0.11 of False Positive
Rate, while increasing the number of samples to 400 leads to 0.96 of TPR
and 0.05 of FPR.
The number of samples used to compute the mean and the standard
deviation for each of the above traffic features is proportional to the detection
delay, i.e., the time window required to collect such a number of samples.
Figure 7 shows the quantile 0.05, 0.5, and 0.95 associated to the detection
delay for each of the four flows, as a function of the number of samples. It
is possible to notice that the flows from the RC to the drone (and similarly,
from the drone to the RC) exhibit the same performance, independently from
the particular operational mode of the drone, i.e., being it steady or moving.
For the Drone to RC flow, being characterized by the highest throughput,
the detection delay is smaller than the RC to drone flow.
Given the linear relationship between the number of samples and the
detection delay, a good trade-off between detection performance and delay
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Figure 6: TPR and FPR to detect the state of the drone as a function of the number of
eavesdropped packets.
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can be estimated in 200 samples (FPR=0.11, TPR=0.91) being equivalent
to about 2.45 seconds and 0.73 seconds of eavesdropping time, for the RC
to drone and the drone to RC flow, respectively. Better performance can
be achieved using 400 samples (FPR=0.05, TPR=0.96) while incurring in a
detection delay of about 4.8 seconds for the RC to drone flow and 1.5 seconds
for the drone to RC flow.
To provide further insights, we also investigated the relative impact, i.e.,
the weight, that each feature has in the model. Figure 8 summarizes our
analysis, showing the normalized feature importance in the above scenario,
as it has been obtained via the Machine Learning Toolbox of MATLAB
R2019a.
Figure 8: Normalized Feature Importance with different sample size (and detection delay).
The standard deviation of the interarrival time between the packets (yel-
low bars) has the highest impact, showing a feature importance value that is
almost 35%. Among the other features, we report that the mean of the inter-
arrival time, as well as the “raw” interarrival time between packets, always
emerge as the second important feature.
These considerations will be further leveraged later on in Section 9, where
we will discuss the effect of evasion strategies that an attacker can deploy.
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7. Detecting a drone into the wild
This section introduces the techniques and methodologies used by PiNcH
to detect the presence of a drone in different scenarios. We consider five
different traces from the CRAWDAD data-set [46] and one trace collected
from a crowded outdoor area in Doha, Qatar. We considered these traces
as our reference scenarios for testing the presence of the drone. The traces
have been selected to guarantee the maximum scenario heterogeneity and
the presence of different WiFi network patterns. Table 4 shows the traces we
Table 4: WiFi traces description.
ID Description Size (B) Ref.
S1
Wireless LAN traffic trace collected from
PSU (Portland State University) Library.
89905 [47]
S2
Wireless LAN traffic trace collected from
PSU (Portland State University) Cafeteria.
131301 [47]
S3
Wireless LAN traffic trace collected from
a large outdoor area in downtown Portland.
29795 [47]
S4
Tcpdump trace from the wireless network
at a three-day computer-science conference.
110492 [48]
S5
Wireless probe requests collected at a
political meeting in Rome, Italy.
11799 [49]
S6
Measurement from an outdoor area in
Doha, Qatar.
82651
selected to test the presence of the drone, together with a brief description
of them.
We carefully analyzed the content of the traces and we selected a time pe-
riod of 10 minutes from each trace, to provide a balanced data set, where the
duration of the traces is the same. We consider several scenarios: a library
(S1), a cafeteria (S2), outdoor areas (S3, S6), a computer science conference
(S4), and a political meeting (S5). We selected both indoor (S1, S2, S4, S5)
and outdoor scenarios (S3, S6), with the presence of both smart-phones and
laptops, and characterized by different moving patterns.
Given the performance of the previous configurations, we select the Ran-
dom Forest classifier, the Drone to RC flow and the 10-fold cross-validation
method. The Drone to RC flow guarantees also a more realistic scenario,
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being usually the drone more exposed to the eavesdropping equipment com-
pared to the remote controller. Moreover, in this section we consider the
features computed over a time window of 20 samples, being equivalent to
less than 0.28 seconds of channel eavesdropping (quantile 0.95 value). This
leads to a total number of 2,142 instances, where for each test the 214 samples
were randomly chosen to be the test set (10%), while the remaining samples
were used for training.
In addition, we only consider the scenario related to the moving drone, be-
ing more suitable for the detection problem introduced by Figure 1. Finally,
we mixed each of the above traces with a standalone trace of the moving
drone.
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Figure 9: TP and FP rates for the detection of the drone in the 6 scenarios, i.e., S1, S2,
S3, S4, S5, and S6. The red circle represents an average estimation of all the scenarios.
The green circles in Figure 9 show the TPR as a function of the FPR for
each of the previously introduced scenarios S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6. We
highlight that the Random Forest classifier performs extremely well, being
able to detect the presence of the drone with FP < 0.0027 (worst case, S4)
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and TP > 0.9984 (worst case, S5). Finally, we report an estimation of the
average behaviour by the red circle characterized by FP = 8.9 · 10−4 and FN
= 1-TP = 0.9 · 10−4.
We further analyze the detection delay for the previously introduced sce-
narios S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6. The detection delay is a particularly
relevant metric, since it provides an estimation of the time required to detect
the presence of the drone.
Recalling the scenario introduced in Figure 1, we observe that the detec-
tion delay significantly affects the probes layout and the surveillance area.
Indeed, large detection delays do imply larger reaction time and, in turn, a
much larger surveillance area to guarantee enough reaction time. Conversely,
short detection delays allow for faster reaction time and shorter distances be-
tween the target and probes.
We adopted the following configuration: Random Forest classifier, fea-
tures computed over consecutive samples spanning between 5 and 200, 10-
fold cross-validation method, and finally the scenarios S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and
S6. Figure 10 shows the TPR as a function of the FPR, varying the number
of samples for the 6 different scenarios. We observe that the Random Forest
classifier is effective in detecting the presence of the drone in all the scenarios,
i.e., for the majority of the cases FP < 3 · 10−3 and TP > 0.997, even for the
worst-case scenario where we consider a detection delay based on only five
samples. We highlighted the trends by computing the linear regression for
each scenario, i.e., solid lines in Figure 10.
To estimate the detection delay, we vary the number of samples required
to generate one instance of the features and we compute the detection delay as
a function of the overall SR defined as SR = (TP+TN) / (TP+TN+FP+FN)
as depicted in Figure 11. The detection delay is directly proportional to the
number of samples considered for the computation of the standard deviation
and the mean of the packet size and the inter-arrival time. Such a delay
spans between 0, i.e., only one packet is considered to infer on the presence
of the drone, and 1 second. Moreover, the detection delay might significantly
increase when an overall SR greater than 0.999 is required. Nevertheless, we
observe that the Random Forest classifier guarantees a detection delay less or
equal to half of a second, assuming a SR less than 0.999 for all the scenarios.
The scenarios slightly affect the performance of the classifier: S4 (Computer
Science Conference) is the worst, S2 and S6 (Cafeteria and Outdoor Doha)
behave very similarly, and lastly, S1, S3, and S5 (Library, Outdoor Portland,
and Political Meeting) have the best performance.
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Figure 10: TPR and FPR for the 6 scenarios while varying the number of eavesdropped
samples. Solid lines represent the linear regression for each of the considered scenario.
8. Drone movements identification
In this section, we consider the problem of identifying the specific move-
ments performed by the drone. We consider 7 different movements as de-
picted in Table 5. To collect the network patterns associated with each drone
movement, we unscrewed the drone’s propellers and we collected about 9400
packets (1 minute) for each drone movement. We used the Random Forest
classifier, and the 10-folds classification method. Differently from our previ-
ous analysis, in this scenario, we do not use the Drone to RC flow but we
consider the overall link, since preliminary experiments indicated that better
performance could be seized.
Figure 12 shows the TPR as a function of the FPR associated to the seven
aforementioned movements. For each movement, we consider different sam-
ple sizes to generate the features spanning between 50 and 500 consecutive
packets. We observe that movement identification is significantly affected by
the sample size; indeed, TPR and FPR span between [0.001, 1] and [0.07,
0.56], respectively.
We also investigate the detection delay related with each sample size.
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Figure 11: Detection delay as a function of the overall SR for the 6 different scenarios.
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Figure 12: TPR and FPR associated to each movement of the drone.
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Table 5: Remote controller commands and corresponding drone movements.
Stick position Description
Pitch down
The right stick is pushed forward and the drone
moves forward.
Pitch up
The right stick is pushed backward and the drone
moves backward.
Roll left
The right stick is pushed left and the drone
moves left.
Roll right
The right stick is pushed right and the drone
moves right.
Throttle up
The left stick is pushed forward and the drone
increases its altitude.
Yaw left
The left stick is pushed left and the drone
rotates left.
Yaw right
The left stick is pushed right and the drone
rotates right.
The results are provided in Figure 13.
It is possible to note that in all the cases the quantile 0.05, 0.5, and
0.95 of the detection delays are almost overlapping, demonstrating that the
interarrival time between packets shows a similar profile over the time, inde-
pendently of the particular movement.
Finally, Figure 14 shows the overall Success Rate (SR) as a function of
the detection delay.
It is worth noting that a total number of just 220 samples, i.e., approxi-
mately 1.5 seconds, are necessary for the Random Forest classifier to guaran-
tee a value of the SR > 0.95 in the discrimination of any movement performed
by the drone. Thus, it is enough to either push or pull the stick of the re-
mote controller for a time frame longer than 1.5 seconds to allow PiNcH to
discriminate the specific movement performed by the drone.
9. Assessing the Robustness of PiNcH
In this section we discuss the robustness of the proposed detection strat-
egy against packet loss and evasion strategies, being these the dominant
factor that could affect the effective deployment of PiNcH.
31
0 100 200 300 400 500
Number of samples
0
1
2
3
4
D
et
ec
ito
n 
de
la
y 
[s]
Pitch down
Pitch up
Roll left
Roll right
Throttle up
Yaw left
Yaw right
Figure 13: Detection delay associated to each movement of the drone.
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Figure 14: Overall SR of the Random Forest classifier as a function of the detection delay.
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Drone Detection and Packet Loss. In Section 7 we showed the re-
markable performance of PiNcH in detecting the presence of a drone in
several scenarios, being them indoor or outdoor.
Since our detection scheme is (partially) based on the interarrival time
between packets, and such a feature is the most dominant, packet loss phe-
nomena can have an impact on the detection performance, especially at long
distances. In fact, the intuition suggests that when the drone-RC commu-
nication link becomes long enough, packets can be lost, leading to larger
interarrival times and decreased detection rates.
To provide further insights on this phenomenon, we investigated the de-
tection rate of PiNcH in outdoor scenarios, by placing the RC-drone commu-
nication link at increasing distances from the location of the eavesdropping
equipment. Figure 15 shows the deployment of our tests, where E is the loca-
tion of the WiFi probe, while the locations S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7 refer
to the tested locations of the RC-drone communication link (i.e, distances of
30, 50, 70, 95, 115, 170, and 200 meters from the drone, respectively).
Figure 15: Map of the location where outdoor experiments have been performed (taken
from Google Earth).
We notice that the location is full of obstacles, providing realistic shad-
owing effects affecting outdoor application scenarios.
We first trained PiNcH on the profile of the traffic acquired at a distance
equal to 0.2 m, and then we tested it on the acquisitions at the various
distances, by considering the whole traffic acquired on the communication
link mixed with the various traces discussed in Sec. 7. Average results are
summarized in Tab. 6.
We highlight that, despite the increasing packet loss percentage at in-
creasing distances, PiNcH is still able to identify the presence of the drone
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Table 6: Packet Loss and Detection Rate at increasing distances from the position of the
eavesdropping equipment.
Location Distance
[m]
Packet
Loss [%]
Detection
Rate [%]
S1 30 0 99.999
S2 50 21.1 99.69
S3 70 33.2 99.23
S4 95 13.3 99.68
S5 115 16.7 99.18
S6 170 74.8 97.43
S7 200 73.8 99.68
with outstanding accuracy (≥ 97%), being robust to packet loss up to 74.8%.
These results suggest that the detection range could be further extended by
using specialized equipment, such as directive antennas, to provide effective
detection even to larger distances.
Evasion Strategies. The previous sections highlighted the remarkable
performance achieved by PiNcH for identifying a drone. By resorting to the
acquisition of packet size and interarrival times via general-purpose eaves-
dropping equipment, PiNcH can identify the presence of a drone in several
scenarios with outstanding accuracy, requiring just a negligible detection de-
lay.
In this section, we assume the adversary is aware of the deployment of
PiNcH, and therefore, she implements a strategy to escape the detection,
by modifying on purpose the profile of the features exploited to detect the
presence of the drone.
For instance, being aware that the interarrival time is the most important
feature of our drone detection solution, the attacker can delay the delivery
time of the packets, in order for the eavesdropping equipment to record a
profile of interarrival times that is different from the expected one, possibly
leading to incorrect classification.
We emulated the evasion attack performed by the attacker, by summing
random delays extracted from a uniform distribution [0,∆] to the interar-
rival times, with ∆ being arbitrarily large, up to 0.1 s. By focusing on the
six scenarios tackled in Section 7 and assuming a window size of 21 sam-
ples, Figure 16 shows the False Negative Rate (FNR), i.e., the number of
samples incorrectly classified as “no-drone”, although being from the drone
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communication channel, while increasing the maximum delay ∆.
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Figure 16: False Negative Rate as a function of the maximum delay ∆ in the communica-
tion pattern.
We observe that the effectiveness of the evasion attack strictly depends
on the particular scenario, i.e., on the features of the surrounding encrypted
traffic.
With reference to the scenarios S5 and S4, we notice that the attacker
could delay the delivery of the packets (either on the RC or on the drone) of
a maximum value of 20 ms to effectively escape the detection (FNR ≥ 0.8
when the maximum injected delay is up to 0.2 seconds). This finding is
due to the “distance” between the distribution of the traffic of the RC-drone
communication link and the distribution of the surrounding traffic, which are
close to each other.
Regarding the scenarios S2 and S3, a greater value of the maximum delay
is necessary to effectively avoid the detection. Specifically, we notice that the
attacker has to delay packets with a maximum delay of 60 ms to cause the
incorrect classification of about 25% of the samples, while larger values of
the FNR are obtained with a maximum delay of 80 ms, where FNR reaches
values of about 70%.
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At the same time, evasion attacks seem not to be effective in the case of
the scenario S1, where delaying the packets of 0.1 s lead to FNR values less
than 15%.
Finally, in scenario S6, FNR reaches the value of 53% for a maximum
delay of 20 ms, and then, it remains almost constant for increasing delays.
In this case, the profile of the “modified” traffic is equally different from the
two known distributions, leading to an almost random decision.
Overall, the results reported above should be assessed also considering the
maneuverability, latency, and response time of the drone itself. While very
short delays of the packets do not affect the communication link and the drone
maneuverability, large values (e.g., 100 ms) reduce the response time and
the capability of controlling the drone, especially when it is moving at high
speeds and characterized by a heavy weight (high inertia)— this is common
for drones carrying payloads. Note also that the on purpose introduced delay
values sum up to the intrinsic delay of the RC-drone communication link,
and therefore, further increase the overall latency of the communication link.
Available reports on the subject indicate that military drones can tolerate up
to a maximum latency of 1 ms, while for commercial drones values of delays
exceeding 60-70 ms significantly affect the maneuverability of the drone and
have an impact on the human perception of the performance [50].
Thus, depending on the specific scenario and the setup of the RC-drone
communication link, the application of evasion strategies should be carefully
evaluated by the attacker, trading off between the evasion of the detection
and its effective capability of controlling the device, in particular at long
distances.
We highlight that, despite the strategy discussed above is not the only one
that can be used by the adversary to escape the detection, other strategies
(such as the setup of a persistent active connection between the drone and
the RC) would not guarantee any result and, in addition, they would quickly
drain the battery of the drone, further reducing its operational time.
Finally, we point out that, despite the possible advantages that the adver-
sary could gain in carefully implementing tailored evasion techniques, at this
time there are no products actually implementing advanced evasion strate-
gies.
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10. Theoretical and Experimental Comparison
In this section we compare PiNcH against the solutions available in the
literature at the time of this writing. Section 10.1 provides a thorough com-
parison based on several system requirements, while Section 10.2 provides an
experimental comparison on real data.
10.1. Theoretical Comparison
Table 7 provides a comparison between our proposed approach and the
closest related work in the literature, based on several system requirements.
On the one hand, RF-based approaches such as [21] and [28] only accom-
plished the detection of a single brand of drone, whose firmware is based on
a closed operating system. Thus, their results are not directly applicable to
other brands. Moreover, as anticipated in Section 2, these approaches usually
have to rely on specific hardware, such as Software Defined Radio.
On the other hand, competing approaches based on encrypted traffic anal-
ysis are still based on closed source firmware and operating systems. In ad-
dition, none of the previous work evaluated the effectiveness of the drone
detection scheme in various scenarios with real traces. Moreover, we are the
first ones to prove the robustness of the detection scheme when confronting
with packet loss, showing the practical applicability of encrypted traffic anal-
ysis toward the protection of critical infrastructures.
Furthermore, differently from competing approaches, in this paper, we
provide an estimation of the detection performance of our methodology in
the presence of evasion attacks, i.e., smart strategies where the attacker mod-
ifies the profile of the interarrival times of the packets on purpose to avoid
detection. On the one hand, the effectiveness of such techniques strongly
depends on the specific scenario, while on the other hand, their application
could significantly decrease the response time and the maneuverability of the
drone.
Finally, we remark that the source data adopted by this work have been
released as open-source at the link [18], to allow practitioners, industries, and
academia to verify our claims and use them as a basis for further development.
10.2. Experimental Performance Comparison
To provide further insights, in this section we compare the performance
of PiNcH against the one of the most closed peer-reviewed scientific contri-
bution at the time of this writing, that is the scheme proposed by the authors
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Table 7: Comparison of PiNcH with related work on passive drone detection.
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in [27].
The contribution in [27] discusses a framework for the detection and brand
identification of commercial drones based on Machine Learning, by using the
same basic features adopted in our work, that are the packet size and packets
interarrival times. However, despite PiNcH, the work in [27] selects the one-
vs-all logistic multi-class classification algorithm as the tool to discriminate
drone traffic from the generic one. Unfortunately, the authors did make nei-
ther the raw data nor the code publicly available for any direct comparison.
Therefore, following the discussion in the reference paper, we replicated the
implementation of the method they proposed and we tested its performance.
Specifically, we compared the overall Success Rate (SR) of PiNcH and the
proposal in [27] as for the drone detection performance in several real-life
scenarios, matching the ones used in our analysis reported in Section 7.
We investigated the performance of the approaches by increasing the number
of samples used for the computation of the mean and standard deviation of
the features, from 51 to 101 samples. We recall that, as depicted in Figure
7 of the manuscript, such a number of samples is directly connected to the
detection delay, from a minimum value of 0.334 s to the maximum value of
0.661 s. The results are reported in Fig. 17.
The results show that the performance and the overall success rate of the
approach proposed by the authors in [27] depends strictly on the selected
scenario. While in the political meeting (S5) and local outdoor (S6) scenar-
ios the performance of the benchmarking technique are similar to the ones
of PiNcH (with detection rates that are in accordance to the ones reported
in the reference paper), in the remaining four scenarios, the overall success
rate is significantly lower than our technique. In addition, increasing the
number of samples used for the computation of the statistical indexes of the
features, i.e., increasing the detection delay, not always leads to a significant
improvement.
Considering the same requirements on the detection delay, PiNcH is char-
acterized by remarkable performance in the detection of a drone in all the 6
analyzed scenarios, and its performance always improve when increasing the
detection delay.
Finally, despite the better performance with shorter detection delays of our
proposed approach against the competing solutions, we stress that the major
contributions of our work are the following: (i) we demonstrate that network
traffic analysis can be considered as a valuable and meaningful tool to de-
tect Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS); (ii) we experimentally show
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Figure 17: Overall Success Rate (SR) in detecting the presence of a drone for the 6 different
scenarios investigated in our paper, using PiNcH and the proposal by Alipour et al. in [27],
by increasing the number of samples used for the computation of the features.
that network traffic analysis is a robust solution against packet losses and
adversarial strategies; and, finally, that (iii) such technique could detect the
presence of a drone, its current status, and its movements in a short time
frame; all these features being seamlessly integrable with both commercial
devices and additional drone detection solutions.
11. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced PiNcH : a methodology to detect the
presence of a remotely-controlled drone in several heterogeneous environ-
ments with a high degree of assurance and a very short delay. PiNcH is also
capable of identifying the drone’s movements. These results are achieved
without resorting to any active techniques, but just eavesdropping the radio
traffic. In particular, we proved that network traffic classification can be
effectively used to detect and identify the 3DR SOLO—the most popular
open-source drone—as well as all the UAVs employing the popular operating
system ArduCopter (such as some DJI and Hobbyking vehicles). Indeed, we
provide an upper bound on the detection delay when using the aforemen-
tioned methodology.
40
We tested our methodology against six different scenarios and we proved
that PiNcH can detect an RPAS drone in less than 0.28 seconds with a SR of
about 0.998 (worst case). Further, PiNcH can be effectively used to identify
each of the drone’s movements in about 1.5 seconds, with a SR greater than
0.95. The comparison against the competing solution in the literature does
show that PiNcH enjoys superior performance in several scenarios. We also
evaluated the effectiveness of PiNcH in an outdoor scenario, showing that our
methodology is still quite robust also when more than 70 % of the packets
are lost. Finally, we also evaluated the robustness of PiNcH to evasion
attacks, where the profile of the traffic of the drone is modified on purpose
to avoid detection. In this scenario, we showed that the effectiveness of
such strategy is strongly dependent on the specific scenario, and likely not
of general applicability, since evasion techniques could severely degrade the
controller-drone channel, and hence its maneuverability.
Given that our study has been performed on a popular open-source op-
erating system for drones—and all the collected data have been publicly
released—, it can be also used to detect and identify different brands and
models of drones, other than applying to other contexts as well.
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